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GANGMASTERING PASSATA: MULTI-TERRITORIALITY OF 
THE FOOD SYSTEM AND THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
CHEAP LABOR BEHIND THE GLOBALIZED ITALIAN 
TOMATO 
Dr. Tomaso Ferrando* 
ABSTRACT 
Italy is the second largest producer of tomatoes in the world after the 
United States, and it is often considered the homeland of this food. Yet, the 
Italian tomato is much more than Italian. If one considers the people, 
geography, regulations, and history behind the “golden pome” (pomo-d’oro 
in Italian), there is no other conclusion than it is inherently local and global. 
In the last years, the Italian tomato sector has been under scrutiny for reliance 
on exploited labor, egregious living conditions, and the role of organized 
crime in trading human beings as any other commodity (“gangmastering” or 
caporalato). By embedding the Italian industrial tomato into a critical and 
multi-territorial legal approach to the food system, my contribution aims to 
offer a different perspective on the illegal action of labor intermediation as 
one of the most discussed issues surrounding the production of Italian 
tomatoes. Rather than presenting exploitation and caporalato as exceptions, 
this paper analyzes them through the lenses of trade law, competition law, 
and migration law as more appropriate lenses to understand the role of cheap 
labor in the construction of the global Italian tomato. If that is the case, legal 
interventions cannot be local and specific, but must be systemic, multi-
layered and, therefore, based on dialogue and solidarity among workers, 
lawyers, activists, and academics across the whole tomato chain. 
 
I.   Tomatoes: Italian Pride with a Global Side .................................. 522 
II.   Exploitation, Violence, Death, and Illegal Intermediation Behind the 
Italian Passata ............................................................................ 526 
III.   The Criminal Turn Against Enslavement, Intermediation, and 
Exploitation ................................................................................ 529 
A. Reducing or Holding a Person in a Condition of Slavery of 
Servitude .............................................................................. 530 
 
 *   Research Professor, Faculty of Law (Law and Development Research Group) and Institute of 
Development Policy, University of Antwerp 
5 - FERRANDO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/2021  12:13 PM 
522 FIU Law Review [Vol. 14:521 
 
B. Employment of Third Countries’ Citizens Without Regular 
Permit .................................................................................. 531 
C. Illicit Intermediation and Exploitation of Labor .................... 532 
IV.   What the Anti-caporalato Law Cannot Grasp: Cheap Labor and 
Disposable Lives as a Function of the Italian Global Passata ....... 536 
V.   Transnational Collaboration to Escape the Political and Legislative 
“Catch-22” .................................................................................. 541 
VI.  Conclusion .................................................................................. 543 
 
I. TOMATOES: ITALIAN PRIDE WITH A GLOBAL SIDE 
If there was a ranking of stereotypical images of Italy, the “pizza, pasta 
& mafia” tryptic would certainly stand on the podium alongside loudness, 
our love for “la dolce vita,” and the strong sense of family.1 This article is 
not an attempt to use legal analysis to reproduce popular clichés. However, it 
stems from the recognition that food and mafia are among the most 
“exported” Italian “products” and that the global popularity of the former 
may have something to do with the local strength of the latter. This does not 
mean that all the Italian food is obtained or distributed with the support of 
criminal organizations, nor that mafia would not exist without the control of 
the food chain and the extraction of value from it. Yet, once we look closely 
at the way in which part of the Italian food system operates, it is possible to 
realize how the construction and interaction between spaces of legality and 
illegality are embedded in “Made in Italy” as a brand that is recognized, 
appreciated, and consumed all around the planet.  
As an Italian, I decided to pick the example of the Italian processing 
tomato and the Italian tomato sauce (passata) as a product that is mostly 
associated with my territory, culture, and gastronomy. As a matter of fact, 
when you visualize pizza and pasta in the stereotypical tryptic, did you not 
imagine the former covered with a thin layer of passata and a dish of 
spaghetti or a lasagna tray mixed with a Bolognese ragout? If we associate 
Italy with tomatoes, it is not an accident but a consequence of the centrality 
that tomatoes and the tomato industry have in the country’s recent economy 
and in its international trade balance. If we want to challenge the 
contemporary idea that food is a fetish to be admired on TV and shed some 
light on the legal and social complexity that lies behind the Italian food 
 
1 Nicole Arriaga, Pizza, Pasta, Mafia, AM. MAG. (Feb. 25, 2011), 
www.theamericanmag.com/pizza-pasta-mafia. 
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system, there is no better place to start than with something so important for 
the Italian economy and culture—tomatoes.2 
Italy is the second in the world for annual volume of processing tomato, 
after the US (mainly California) and followed by China.3 From North (mainly 
Emilia Romagna, followed by Lombardia, Veneto, Piemonte, and Toscana) 
to South (Puglia, Campania, Basilicata, Molise, and, to an extent, Sicily), 
there are around 9,564 farms and 64,500 hectares of land dedicated to this 
vegetable,4 with a total production of 4.8 million tons. More interestingly, 
Italian processing companies (around ninety-one throughout the country)5 
account for 49 percent of European and 13 percent of global transformation 
of these tomatoes into juices, sauces, and other products, with annual revenue 
estimated at 3.3 billion euros.6 Half of the processing tomatoes that are 
transformed in Italy—worth 1.7 billion euros—is exported globally: it would 
be unlikely, entering into a supermarket chain in a world capital, not to find 
processed tomato coming from Italy.7 Of all products realized from 
processing tomatoes, the Italian passata is by far the most popular among 
consumers and the most commercialized and thus has been chosen as a 
symbol to represent the whole tomato chain from farm to fork.8  
 
2 Henry Bernstein & Liam Campling, Commodity Studies and Commodity Fetishism II: “Profits 
with Principles”, 6 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 414 (2006). 
3 Pomodoro, l’Italia supera i 3 miliardi di fatturato, FOODWEB (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://www.foodweb.it/2019/01/pomodoro-italia-3-miliardi-fatturato/. Industrial tomato is different from 
table tomato: the former is produced to be transformed into sauces or preserved, while the latter is 
consumed fresh. The production of table tomato in Italy is shrinking and national varieties are suffering 
from the increased import of table tomatoes produced within the EU (Netherlands and Spain above all), 
but also outside of the European Union (Morocco and Northern Africa in particular). Profondo rosso per 
il pomodoro italiano, ITALIAFRUIT NEWS (Apr. 15, 2019), 
http://www.italiafruit.net/DettaglioNews/49118/la-categoria-del-mese/profondo-rosso-per-il-pomodoro-
italiano. 
4 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, tomato is botanically a fruit but is considered a 
vegetable by nutritionists. In the absence of a hard-and-fast rule that clearly designates a botanical fruit as 
a vegetable, the Encyclopedia concludes that it is acceptable for tomatoes to be classified as vegetables. 
Melissa Petruzzello, Is a Tomato a Fruit or a Vegetable?, BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/story/is-a-tomato-a-fruit-or-a-vegetable (last visited Jan. 31, 2020). 
5 Domenico Perrotta, Produrre la qualità. I pomodori pelati tra industria, tradizione e conflitti, 
93 MERIDIANA 71 (2018). 
6 Pomodoro, Italia secondo trasformatore al mondo con 4,8 milioni di tonnellate, ANSA (Oct. 24, 
2019, 1:53 PM), http://www.ansa.it/canale_terraegusto/notizie/business/2019/10/24/pomodoro-italia-
secondo-trasformatore-al-mondo-48-mln-ton_66cee169-79be-4fec-af7c-6c3d41a97474.html.  
7 Italy is the first producer of agricultural products in Europe, with a total value of its production 
estimated at 55 billion euros per year and a processing sector worth 31.5 billion euros. Export is constantly 
increasing at a pace that is faster than the European average. ISMEA, RAPPORTO SULLA COMPETITIVITA 
DELL’AGROALIMENTARE ITALIANO (2018). 
8 Italy accounts for 65 percent of the value of EU exported passata. Id. 
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Italy is internationally perceived as the country of the tomato. However, 
when we look at the reasons behind the Italian leadership in processing 
tomatoes, we unveil a history that is much more global than stereotypes may 
reveal. The link between Italy and tomatoes is a relatively short journey of 
five centuries that started with the Spanish colonization of Latin America, the 
cruel mission of Hernan Cortes around 1540,9 and the almost contemporary 
annexation of the South of Italy by the Habsburg Empire, an essential 
condition for the arrival of the tomatoes in the territories below Rome and 
their diffusion in the perfect climatic conditions. Yet, the Italian processing 
tomato industry would have not flourished—or not flourished in the same 
way—without Napoleon’s investments in canning as an efficient way to 
preserve food for his army and would not have reached the global market had 
Garibaldi not led the “One Thousands” expedition in 1860 and opened the 
flow of capital from the North to the South. It was then, when the fertile 
territories of the South of Italy met the Northern capital and technological 
innovation, that Italy became the fulcrum of the tomato processing industry, 
with tens of processing plants in Parma and Piedmont receiving raw material 
from the “Meridione” and exporting tomato paste and preserved peeled 
tomatoes across Europe. 
From a historical perspective, the success of the Italian passata is often 
told as the outcome of a combination of violence, technology, the birth of 
Italian capitalism, law, and politics. Yet, it is more. What is often missing 
from this account—from contemporary academic and legal engagements 
with the issue—is the role that people, and farmworkers especially, played 
and still play in the construction of Italy as a global competitor in the 
production and transformation of agricultural products—including 
processing tomato.10 This was the case in 1861, when farmworkers in the 
newly annexed South earned half the money of farmworkers in the North, 
unemployment in the South was extremely high, living conditions were 
extremely poor, and a cheap workforce supported the development of 
processing facilities and transformation activities owned by Northern 
families and the distribution of products across Europe.11 It is also the case 
today, when thousands of workers—mainly EU migrants and non-European 
citizens—are employed in the production of tomatoes (and other agricultural 
products) without the guarantees of a minimum salary or a proper contract, 
live in unhealthy and inadequate conditions, are often victims of abuses and 
 
9 JOHN PAUL ZRONIK, HERNANDO CORTÉS: SPANISH INVADER OF MEXICO (2007).  
10 LABOR RELATIONS IN GLOBALIZED FOOD (Alessandro Bonanno & Josefa Salete Barbosa 
Cavalcanti eds., 2014). 
11 PASQUALE VILLARI, LETTERE MERIDIONALI (1878); DENIS MACK SMITH, STORIA D’ITALIA 
DAL 1861 AL 1997 (6th ed. 2011).  
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violence, and whose cheap labor is crucial in maintaining the competitiveness 
of the Italian tomato.12 For some authors, we are facing a new ‘Questione 
Meridionale’ (Southern Question), but this question is interconnected with 
the global market.13 
This article uses the example of the passata to combine a legal approach 
to the response against the exploitative working conditions of farmworkers 
in the Italian agricultural sector with the analysis of the political economy of 
the food system in which they are embedded. The aim is not only to identify 
opportunities and shortcomings of the legislative and regulatory 
interventions that have been adopted but to highlight the importance of a 
systemic approach to exploitation and to trigger considerations on the 
interdependence of competitiveness and cheap lives. To set the stage, the next 
section provides an overview of workers’ conditions in the agricultural sector 
and introduces the phenomenon of caporalato (gangmastering) as a diffused 
practice aimed at extracting value from workers taking advantage of their 
state of need and inferior bargaining power. In Section III, the article presents 
the three main national legal responses against caporalato and contemporary 
forms of enslavement in the Italian agri-food sector, highlighting the most 
recent transformations of the discipline along with the opportunities and 
shortcomings of each legal structure. Then, Section IV departs from the 
narrow focus on ‘worker-caporale-employer’ and embeds the tomato picker 
in the context of national and international food chains to discuss the needs 
for a multi-holistic approach based on the systemic understanding of the 
economic, legal, and political dynamics underlying the distribution of power 
and value between farmworkers, gangmasters, employers, and the rest of the 
chain. Finally, the conclusion offers some elements of reflection on the 
“Catch-22” situation experienced by Italy in the context of growing 
competition, fragile economy, increase presence of migrants in the country, 
and abandonment of the farmland.  
 
12 The notion of cheapness is adopted from the work of Raj Patel and Jason W. Moore on the 
construction of world capitalism through the extraction and appropriation of non-rewarded value from 
people and nature. Cheapness is not only a material condition that refers to the price, but also indicates a 
vision and an approach towards the planet and human beings that subordinates their needs and rights and 
that takes advantage of their reproductive capacity. See JASON W. MOORE, CAPITALISM IN THE WEB OF 
LIFE: ECOLOGY AND THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL (2015); RAJ PATEL & JASON W. MOORE, A 
HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN SEVEN CHEAP THINGS: A GUIDE TO CAPITALISM, NATURE, AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE PLANET (2017); RAJ PATEL, THE VALUE OF NOTHING: WHY EVERYTHING COSTS SO MUCH MORE 
THAN WE THINK (2009). 
13 LA GLOBALIZZAZIONE DELLE CAMPAGNE: MIGRANTI E SOCIETÀ RURALI NEL SUD ITALIA (Carlo 
Colloca & Alessandra Corrado eds., 2013). 
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II. EXPLOITATION, VIOLENCE, DEATH, AND ILLEGAL 
INTERMEDIATION BEHIND THE ITALIAN PASSATA 
The 2019 EBAN report on agricultural work in Italy describes a sector 
characterized by 1.1 million workers, 90% of whom have a temporary 
contract with an average length of 87 days, almost a third of a full-time 
agricultural job.14 Having a regular contract means access to a series of 
conditions such as the benefit of minimum salary for agricultural workers, 
established by means of national collective bargaining at 7.13 euros per hour 
and 1,201.84 euros per month, the payment of monthly contributions to the 
national social security, and the possession of a contract that can be used to 
demonstrate financial conditions allowing easier access to housing and credit.  
At the same time, unofficial data produced by civil society associations 
and research centers in 2016 revealed that a significant share of those 
agricultural workers, between 400,000 and 430,000, are hired irregularly 
(i.e., without a correspondence between what is officially declared and the 
hours worked), or in a condition of regulatory invisibility (i.e., without any 
contract or declaration).15 Of these 400,000 thousand people, 80 percent are 
foreigners and about 132,000 are considered to be particularly vulnerable, 
marginalized, and in a state of socio-economic marginalization.16  
From the apple fields in Piedmont (North-West) to the ghetto of Tre 
Capitoli in Foggia (South-East), thousands of women and men employed in 
the agriculture industry face systematic violations of working-time rules, 
including failure to grant daily breaks, weekly rest periods, and annual 
holidays; wages that are half the minimum national requirement17; payment 
in piece rates despite the legislative prohibition; charges to use transport 
provided by employers; confiscation of their passports and identity 
documents; living in the same place where they work (“which exacerbates 
isolation and segregation that in turn increases vulnerability to human rights 
 
14 Press Release, EBAN, Osservatorio EBAN Lavoro Agricolo – Rapporto Annuale 2018 (Apr. 4, 
2019) (on file with author). 
15 Osservatorio Placido Rizzotto, FLAI (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.flai.it/osservatoriopr/osservatorio-placido-rizzotto/. 
16 Id. 
17 FABIO CICONTE & STEFANO LIBERTI, SPOLPATI: LA CRISI DELL’INDUSTRIA DEL POMODORO 
TRA SFRUTTAMENTO E INSOSTENIBILITÀ (2016), http://www.filierasporca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Terzo-Rapporto-Filierasporca_WEB1.pdf. 
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abuses”)18; inadequate or even inhumane living conditions; forms of control 
over workers’ lives by employers, including the use of surveillance.19  
Yet, this is not everything. According to the Placido Rizotto 2018 
Report on Agromafie and Caporalato,20 around 60 percent of the migrant 
agricultural workers do not have access to clean water or sanitation. Most of 
them live in camps (or “ghettos”) and are victims of physical and moral 
abuses,21 with sexual violence, blackmails, rapes, and abortions, which have 
been recorded throughout the years but seldom denounced, addressed and 
dealt with.22 It may not appear so evident when you look at a commercial of 
a tasty Italian passata, but the Modern Slavery Index in 2017 recognized that 
the situation in Italy is among the most worrisome in the EU, with “the risk 
of modern slavery [set] to worsen . . . over the next year, with agriculture a 
sector of concern, and the agricultural sector plays a central role in this 
direction.”23 
Exploitation and violence are not the only two fears of migrant 
agricultural workers. As Mangano wrote in June 2018, Italian farms are like 
a contemporary “Spoon River,” a graveyard of untold stories of people who 
died without notice. Since 2013, more than 1500 farmworkers have lost their 
lives, including some Italians working without contracts. Some died because 
of the intense heat and the long hours of work; others were smashed by 
tractors or falling trees; numerous workers lost their lives in the fires that 
regularly break out in the ghettos (e.g., Rosarno in 2018, Borgo Mezzanone 
and Rignano Gragnanico in 2019); others were killed by the police or by 
 
18 2018 Findings: Italy, GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX, 
www.globalslaveryindex.org/2018/findings/country-studies/italy/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) [hereinafter 
GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX]. 
19 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EXPLOITED LABOUR: MIGRANT WORKERS IN ITALY’S 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (2012), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR30/020/2012/en/; LETIZIA 
PALUMBO, TRAFFICKING AND LABOUR EXPLOITATION IN DOMESTIC WORK AND THE AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR IN ITALY (2016), 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/42406/GGP_TRAFFICKO_2016_EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAl
lowed=y.  
20 AA. VV., AGROMAFIE E CAPORALATO (Osservatorio Placido Rissotto ed., 4th ed. 2018). 
21 OXFAM & TERRA! ONLUS, HUMAN SUFFERING IN ITALY’S AGRICULTURAL VALUE CHAIN 3–4 
(2018), https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620479/cs-human-suffering-
italy-agricultural-value-chain-210618-en.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y. 
22 Antonello Mangano, Violentate nel silenzio dei campi a Ragusa. Il nuovo orrore delle schiave 
romene, L’ESPRESSO (Sept. 15, 2014), 
https://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2014/09/15/news/violentate-nel-silenzio-dei-campi-a-ragusa-il-
nuovo-orrore-delle-schiave-rumene-1.180119?preview=true; Antonello Mangano, “Se tua moglie non sta 
con me non vi pago” Romene nel ragusano tra ricatti e sorprusi, L’ESPRESSO (Oct. 8, 2014), 
https://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2014/10/08/news/rumene-nel-ragusano-tra-ricatti-e-soprusi-ma-
ora-il-territorio-si-mobilita-1.183497.  
23 GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX, supra note 18. 
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Italian citizens that “did justice themselves,” while a worker was scavenging 
some metal parts in an abandoned plot of land.24  
Not surprisingly, criminal organizations and organized crime thrived out 
of the combination of relevant economic activity, human necessities (eating, 
working and surviving), and the state of invisibility, necessity, and need 
experienced by hundreds of thousands of people in the country. The central 
character in this story is the caporale (gangmaster) who acts as an 
intermediary/broker25 between landowners (or tenants) and workers (migrant 
or Italian, seasonal or sedentary) to provide cheap labor and obtain personal 
economic or social benefit.  
Caporali are contacted by farmers (owners or tenants) when work is 
needed, and they recruit the men and women who will be spraying the 
pesticides, harvesting the produces, and putting the food into boxes. They 
will be responsible for the workers during the day and will make sure that 
they are efficient and under control. In addition, they will use their knowledge 
of the employers, the competition between workers, and their connections 
with authorities to make sure that owners can pay less than the minimum 
wage. A 2018 report by two non-governmental organizations, Oxfam and 
Terra! Onlus, sketches the main characteristics of the caporalato system and 
highlights the link between vulnerability, competition, profit, and cheapness: 
Gangmasters (caporali) arbitrarily decide who can be part of 
their teams. Because there are often more workers than jobs 
and because the workers do not have means of 
transportation, the caporale takes advantage of workers’ 
fragile socio-economic status and illegally profits by directly 
deducting money from workers’ daily wages. For each day 
of work, some workers must pay the caporale a fee of €5 for 
transportation to the farm; workers may be also forced to buy 
food and water from the caporale at a higher price than it 
would cost at the local supermarket (e.g. €1.50 for 50ml 
 
24 Alessia Candito, Migrante ucciso in Calabria a colpi di fucile: era un attivista del sindacato, 
LA REPUBBLICA (June 2, 2018), 
https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2018/06/03/news/colpi_di_fucile_in_calabria_contro_migranti_un_m
orto_e_due_feriti-198023690/; Antonello Mangano, La strage silenziosa dei campi, dove italiani e 
migranti muoiono insieme, L’ESPRESSO (June 15, 2018), 
https://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2018/06/11/news/la-strage-silenziosa-dei-campi-dove-italiani-e-
migranti-sono-uniti-dalla-morte-1.323615. 
25 The notions of ‘broker’ and ‘broker capitalism’ have been used in sociology and agri-food 
studies to describe the way in which capitalism permeates and unfolds in a market’s peripheries like the 
South of Italy. See Domenico Perrotta, GHETTI, BROKER E IMPERI DEL CIBO La filiera agro-
industriale del pomodoro nel Sud Italia, CARTOGRAFIE SOCIALI, May 2016, at 261; JANE SCHNEIDER & 
PETER SCHNEIDER, CULTURE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN WESTERN SICILY (1976).  
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water and €3.50 for a sandwich). At the end of the day, a sum 
up to €10 per worker—one-third of a worker’s daily wage—
could be illicitly earned by the caporale and his or her 
team.26 
Caporalato is not a new phenomenon and is not an Italian peculiarity. 
In some countries, like the United Kingdom, the phenomenon of 
intermediation in the agricultural sector has been regulated and disciplined 
by law, with the Gangmastering (Licensing) Act of 2004 introducing a 
system of licensing and standards for agencies that place vulnerable workers 
in agricultural work, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA), 
and a number of offenses with penalties up to ten years imprisonment for 
operating without a license. Yet, in Italy there was no specific criminal 
punishment for the illicit intermediation between workers and employers 
until 2011, with courts that had to rely on two offenses introduced by legal 
reform in 1998, “reducing or holding a person in a condition of slavery or 
servitude”27 and the “employment of citizens of third countries without 
regular permit.”28 Only then, the legislator decided to introduce a specific 
criminal offense concerning the act of “illicit intermediation and exploitation 
of labor” with the aim to lower the threshold of criminal liability otherwise 
required by the two other crimes and to better adapt to the changing 
relationships between workers and owners. Five years later, in 2016, the 
discipline of “illicit intermediation” was significantly reformed in its 
thresholds, relevant conduct, and penalties by a new “anti-caporalato” law 
inspired by the rising voices of migrant workers and civil society 
associations. In light of the legal complexity that characterized the state’s 
response to the exploitation of workers and, in particular, the illicit 
intermediation, the next section introduces the main elements of each of the 
three offences and offers some details of the main innovations of the anti-
caporalato law, along with the opportunities and shortcomings that lie 
beneath it. 
III. THE CRIMINAL TURN AGAINST ENSLAVEMENT, 
INTERMEDIATION, AND EXPLOITATION 
The mainstream legislative response against the phenomena of 
caporalato and the exploitation of farmworkers belongs to the Italian 
criminal code and, in particular, to the section dedicated to the protection of 
 
26 OXFAM & TERRA! ONLUS, supra note 21, at 6. 
27 CODICE PENALE [C.P.], art. 600 (It.). 
28 Decreto Legislativo 25 juglio 1998, n.286, G.U. Aug. 18, 1998, n.191 (It.). 
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people and their individual freedom. After a long legislative journey that 
began in 1938, which has been significantly influenced by the European 
Directives, the current legal framework is characterized by three separate 
offenses that differ in characterization, relevant conduct, legal requirements, 
and punishment: (a) “reducing or holding a person in a condition of slavery 
or servitude,”29 (b) “employment of citizens of third countries without regular 
permit,”30 and (c) the crime of “illicit intermediation and exploitation of 
labor.”31 A brief overview of the dispositions is useful to understand the 
potential of each provision and, more importantly, the limits of each of them. 
A. Reducing or Holding a Person in a Condition of Slavery of 
Servitude 
Article 600 of the criminal code, as reformed in 2003 and 2014, is a 
wide disposition that sanctions the conduct of whoever “exercises over a 
person powers corresponding to those of the right of ownership” or  
Reduces or holds a person in a state of continuative 
subjection (realized through violence, threat, deception, 
abuse of authority or profit from a situation of vulnerability, 
physical or mental inferiority or a situation of necessity, or 
by the promise or payment of sums of money or other 
advantages from whom has authority over the person), 
forcing the victim to perform work or sexual services or to 
beg or to perform any other illegal activity that involves 
exploitation or to undergo organ removal.32 
Although most of these conditions can be found in the Italian 
agricultural sector and some of the conduct reflects that of caporali and 
owners, prosecutions have remained the exception and have hardly led to any 
judgments, particularly against legal persons whose businesses may be 
organized around the work of modern slaves.33 There are multiple reasons 
 
29 CODICE PENALE [C.P.], art. 600 (It.). 
30 D.Lgs. n. 286/1998 (It.). 
31 CODICE PENALE [C.P.], art. 603 bis, amended by Legge 29 ottobre 2016, n.199, G.U. Nov. 3, 
2016, n.257 (It.). 
32 Legge 11 agosto 2003, n.228, G.U. Aug. 23, 2003, n.195 (It.); Decreto Legislativo 4 marzo 
2014, n.24, G.U. Mar. 13, 2014, n.60 (It.). 
33 Caporale’s “criminal” liability is provided by Art. 25 quinquies, Legislative Decree No. 
231/2001, but can often be avoided by putting in place an adequate system of due diligence. MARIA 
FRANCESCA CUCCHIARA & ANNA BARACCCHI, ASSOCIAZIONE PER GLI STUDI GIURIDICI 
SULL’IMMIGRAZIONE, THE ITALIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK AGAINST LABOUR EXPLOITATION (Paola 
Cavanna et. al. eds., 2017). 
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why this is the case: the difficulty of getting access to evidence and 
testimony, the indeterminacy of the notion of “continuative subjection” and 
its incompatibility with seasonal workers, and the reference to violence, 
threat or a situation of necessity that is not always compatible with the state 
of economic and social precarity in which farmworkers live, and that pushes 
them into accepting underpaid, irregular, and extenuating jobs. In addition, 
the effectiveness of the norm is affected by the absence of a provision 
excluding the possibility of self-incrimination for victims who denounce the 
abuses (and the subsequent risk of deportation in the absence of a regular 
permit) and by the non-reception of the definition of “condition of 
vulnerability” as a “situation in which the person concerned has no real or 
acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved” as defined in 
Article 2(1) of the Anti-Trafficking Directive 2011/36/UE. In light of this, 
the risk of a conviction between eight and twenty years does not seem to 
represent a relevant deterrent. 
B. Employment of Third Countries’ Citizens Without Regular 
Permit 
A more specific offense was introduced in 1998 as a response to the 
increasing number of undocumented migrants residing in Italy and their 
employment in the Italian economy without regular documents.34 In this case, 
the target is not the intermediary but the employer, and the main purpose of 
the norm seems to be the protection of fair competition among workers rather 
than the protection of the workers’ freedom, life, and human rights. In its 
original formulation, Article 22(12) of Legislative Decree 286/98 exclusively 
focuses on the act of hiring workers without a permit or with an expired 
permit, with no reference to the working conditions, the exploitation, the 
hours of work, and the payment.35 In 2012, Article 22(12 bis)(c) was 
introduced by legislative decree and added the aggravating circumstances of 
hiring undocumented workers in conditions of exceptional exploitation and 
exposure to great danger.36 
Even more than the aforementioned provision on enslavement and 
servitude, the criminalization of whomever employs undocumented migrants 
is characterized by an irremediable flaw in the lack of the automatic exclusion 
of self-incrimination for those migrants who denounce the conditions of 
exploitation or denounce the irregularity of their working conditions. In 
 
34 D.Lgs. n. 286/1998 (It.). 
35 Id. 
36 Decreto Legislativo 16 juglio 2012, n.109, G.U. July 25, 2012, n.172 (It.).  
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addition, the exclusive focus on undocumented workers appears incapable of 
grasping with the reality of agricultural work in Italy, where a large 
percentage of the activities are realized by East Europeans, people with a 
residence permit but insufficient understanding of their rights or bargaining 
power, and asylum seekers who can regularly reside in Italy while waiting 
for the final decision on their status. Rather than an opportunity to improve 
workers’ conditions and contribute to a different distribution of value 
between capital and labor, Article 22(12) is a double edged sword that 
punishes the migrants more than the employers (who face a fine of 5000 euros 
per irregular worker and detention between six months and three years),37 
does not deal with a large part of the agricultural workforce, and that, if 
effective, threatens to significantly reduce the opportunity for undocumented 
migrants to find a source of revenue, pushing them into conditions of 
increased invisibility and, as a consequence, making them even more 
vulnerable and exposed to abuses and criminal organizations. 
C. Illicit Intermediation and Exploitation of Labor 
The third criminal response to the abuses that characterize the Italian 
agricultural sector is represented by an ad hoc offense that challenges the role 
of the intermediaries (i.e., the caporali that act as a hub between workers and 
employers and use their position to extract value from workers and reduce 
costs for employers). Already criminalized in 1949 as a misdemeanor, the 
original focus was on protecting the labor market from the abusive practice 
of intermediation and not on the protection of workers. It was only in 2011, 
after the 2010 “Rosarno riots” that erupted in one of the largest ghettos in 
Italy and the 2011 workers strike in Nardó, that the Italian parliament decided 
to introduce an ad hoc criminal offense under the rubric of the offences 
against people and their freedom. Once enacted, the new Article 603 bis of 
the Italian penal code introduced the criminal relevance of the conduct of 
those individuals undertaking an organized activity of intermediation (i.e., 
hiring workers or organizing them in the context of exploitative jobs, using 
violence, threats, or intimidation, and abusing the needs or necessities of the 
workers).38 The focus was on the caporali and the objective was to deter them 
from operating. 
Besides introducing for the first time in the Italian legal context a 
provision that directly addressed the increasing presence of organized crime 
in the construction of the agricultural labor market, Article 603 bis also 
 
37 D.Lgs. n. 286/1998 (It.). 
38 Legge 14 settembre 2011, n.148, G.U. Sep. 16, 2011, n.216 (It.). 
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identified indexes of exploitation that highlighted four different ways in 
which labor could be made cheap and, consequently, the value produced by 
workers allocated elsewhere along the chain.39 By defining the parameters, 
the legislator was trying to draw a picture of caporalato and define the 
threshold of legal acceptability and unacceptability. Exploitation was defined 
as a combination of (1) the systemic retribution below the national collective 
contract or disproportionate to the quality and quantity of labor provided; (2) 
the systemic violation of the legal limits and requirements for working hours, 
weekly rest, holidays, and leave; (3) the violation of norms on health and 
safety that expose workers to personal danger; and (4) the fact that workers 
operate in working, housing, or surveillance conditions that are particularly 
degrading.40  
Some interpretative issues immediately arose, first of all with regards to 
the request of a minimum level of organization (of people and capital), which 
excluded individual episodes and unorganized forms of intermediation. In 
addition, the disjunction between “hiring” or “organizing” workers did not 
offer a clear solution to those cases where both activities were undertaken. 
Moreover, the need to prove violence, threats, or intimidation suggested that 
no measure could be taken in those cases where workers had decided to be 
the object of intermediation and had accepted the exploitative labor 
conditions, not because of physical or moral constriction but because of their 
economic or irregular situations. In addition, the thresholds of exploitation 
appeared too high, with the reference to “systematic” retribution, 
“systematic” violation, “exposure to danger,” and “particularly” degrading 
conditions that appeared to legalize and legitimize occasional forms of 
exploitation and those forms of subordination that did not reach levels of 
inhumanity. Furthermore, the norm did not introduce any exclusion of self-
incrimination for workers who denounced their exploiter and no form of 
automatic regularization for irregular workers victims of organized crime. 
Finally, despite the relevance of conduct realized by the employer, such as 
corresponding low payments and providing degrading housing conditions, 
Article 603 bis only criminalized the actions of the caporali, without giving 
any relevance to the actions of those who were employing the workers and, 
by exploiting them, benefitting from a lower cost of labor and higher 
margins.41 
Although limited in its application, the introduction of the “anti-
caporalato” law in 2011 had the merit of providing an immediate legal 
response to the thousands of people that had mobilized in Rosarno, Nardó, 
 
39 Legge 29 ottobre 2016, n.199, G.U. Nov. 3, 2016, n.257 (It.). 
40 Id.  
41 L. n. 148/2011 (It.) 
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and in other ghettos around the country, therefore legitimizing their concerns 
and contributing to a nationwide conversation around the parameters, 
requirements, and best way of tackling the issue.42 In the years that followed, 
national and international media started covering the working conditions in 
the Italian agricultural sector, and the agricultural sector as a whole witnessed 
the multiplication of bottom-up organization and coordination, with more 
strikes and acts of resistance happening in Sicily, Calabria, Apulia, and 
Lazio.  
One of the main results was a new round of legislative debate on the 
“anti-caporalato” law and the enactment of an amended version of Article 
603 bis in 2016 that introduced four main innovations: the criminalization 
and punishment of the conduct of those individuals and legal entities (i.e., 
land owners, tenants, processing companies, etc.) who use, hire, or utilize 
workers taking advantage of their situation of need and putting them in a 
condition of exploitation, whether or not there has been an intermediation, 
and independently on the use of threats and violence; the abandonment of the 
idea of “systemic” violations as an index of exploitation in favor of the notion 
of “repeated” violations, a condition that is satisfied when the conduct 
happens more than once; the exclusive focus on the state of need, defined as 
the lack of means to provide for the essential needs of the workers or a 
psychological state of fragility that reduces the contractual autonomy of the 
worker; and the mandatory confiscation of every means used to commit the 
crime, a broad definition that not only includes the land where the mansions 
were undertaken, the barracks where the workers were living, and the vans 
used for the workers’ transportation, but also the price obtained for the goods 
produced by exploited workers, the goods themselves, and any profit 
generated illegally.43  
The extension of the criminal liability from the intermediaries to those 
who hire and exploit workers is not only a legal innovation, but the evidence 
of a move towards a more systemic understanding of the link between law, 
value chains, and the distribution of power and value.44 If law was only an 
instrument of governance and coordination between different actors of the 
chain, the new Article 603 bis would have no relevance because it would be 
seen as a mere sanctioning tool that intervenes ex post. However, if we 
consider legal structures as essential elements in the creation of the condition 
to generate, extract, and accumulate value at all levels of the chain, we realize 
 
42 YVAN SAGNET & LEONARDO PALMISANO, GHETTO ITALIA (2015); MARCO OMIZZOLO, SOTTO 
PADRONE (2019). 
43 L. n. 199/2016 (It.). 
44 See IGLP Law & Glob. Prod. Working Grp., The Role of Law in Global Value Chains: A 
Research Manifesto, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 57 (2016). 
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that the criminal relevance of the conduct of the employers has two main 
implications: (a) the recognition that activities undertaken at one point of the 
chain (i.e., intermediation) have a consequence at other levels of the chain 
(i.e., the cost of labor for the employers and the price of the goods they will 
be selling to the market); and (b) redefines the allocation of bargaining power 
among the actors of the chain, which lead to a redistribution of value, risks, 
and responsibilities. As a matter of optimistic simplification, we could say 
that the risk of confiscation of the land, price, and profit would push the 
employer into reconsidering the economic viability of cheap labor and 
towards implementing forms of employment that do not satisfy the indexes 
of exploitation and that, therefore, would be more respectful and more 
expensive. 
Yet, the attempt by the legislature to redefine the allocative dynamics of 
the agri-food chain by giving criminal relevance to conduct undertaken 
downstream from the intermediation triggers three other considerations 
linked to the possibility of unexpected or underestimated consequences 
deriving from the use of isolated legal interventions (which elsewhere I call 
“legal chokeholds”45) to address issues that are co-constructed across the 
complexity of value chains. Firstly, the identification of the boundary 
between legality and illegality of conduct is always left to judicial 
interpretation, creating the possibility for exploitative behaviors not to be 
considered criminally relevant because of the lack of repetition or the 
application of a strict standard of “degrading conditions.” Secondly, the 
criminalization of certain conduct in the context of rural areas and 
undocumented migrants is often associated with the intensification of the role 
of criminal organizations, the sole entity capable of guaranteeing protection 
and impunity from the enforcement of punitive and effective laws. Thirdly, 
the chain-based approach adopted by the law 199/2016 falls short by not 
recognizing that the materiality of the relationship between employers, 
intermediaries, and workers is significantly determined by the overall 
structure of the chain and by decisions that are taken downstream (i.e., by the 
concentration of the processing, trading, and retailing sector in a limited 
number of players and by the unequal bargaining power between farmers and 
buyers).46 
Despite the positive reactions that have accompanied law 166/2019 and 
the new text of Article 603 bis, the reality on the ground is that the 
 
45 See Tomaso Ferrando, Land Rights at the Time of Global Production: Leveraging Multi-
Spatiality and Legal Chokeholds, 2 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 275 (2017). 
46 See OXFAM AND TERRA! ONLUS, supra note 21, at 1; Alessandra Corrado, Martina Lo Cascio 
& Domenico Perrota, Introduzione. Per un’analisi critica delle filiere e dei sistemi agroalimentari in 
Italia, 93 MERIDIANA 9 (2018). 
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overemphasis on illicit intermediation and the criminalization of farmers may 
have counterproductive effects on workers’ conditions and employment if 
not supported by a redefinition of the whole chain and a reconsideration of 
the legal structures that allow lead firms operating downstream to exercise 
financial and contractual pressure over producers and, as a cascade effect, 
that give strong control over the lives of workers. In a nutshell, the 
criminalization of intermediation and exploitation of cheap labor can hardly 
lead to just working and living conditions if the price received by farmers for 
the agricultural products is significantly lower than the cost of producing 
them without intermediation and exploitation, and if workers are forced in a 
condition of invisibility, socio-economic marginalization, and dependency. 
If the price of a kilo of processing tomatoes that remunerates the employer, 
pays the minimum salary of all the workers, guarantees that they work the 
correct amount of hours, and respects their dignity is thirty (euro) cents per 
kilo, the current offers of five to eleven cents a kilo have almost inevitable 
implications that cannot be addressed by means of criminal law and 
criminalization. Moreover, twenty years of tight migration policies and laws 
have increased the number of undocumented and irregular extra-EU workers 
residing in the country, creating a “reserve army of workers”47 that are 
competing with each other for agricultural jobs but also competing with 
documented and regular workers, are afraid of denouncing because of the 
fear of repatriation and contribute to a vicious circle of cheapness and 
exploitation.  
IV. WHAT THE ANTI-CAPORALATO LAW CANNOT GRASP: CHEAP 
LABOR AND DISPOSABLE LIVES AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
ITALIAN GLOBAL PASSATA 
This article began with a celebration of the Italian passata as one of the 
most popular Italian foods around the world. Yet, popularity in a very 
competitive market that is shared with agricultural giants like the United 
States, China, and Spain cannot be achieved with the sole brand and the 
quality of “Made in Italy.” Leaving aside the dynamics of the niche markets, 
competitiveness requires keeping prices as low as possible by reducing costs, 
increasing efficiency, and—why not—producing non-internalized social and 
environmental externalities. When we think about the material conditions of 
workers farming processing tomatoes across Italy, we have to first embed 
them into the transnational food system that not only connects multiple actors 
 
47 FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND 77 (Mark Harris 
ed., Panther ed. 2010). 
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within the same “passata chain” (owners, traders, processors, retailers, and 
consumers), but also creates competition between different “passata chains,” 
often rewarding those who can offer a cheaper product.  
In this context, an effective legal and political response cannot be 
narrowly focused on the local exploitation but must be capable of 
understanding the existence of root causes behind cheap labor, cheap lives, 
and cheap nature that are functional to the existence of the global Italian 
passata.48 They have to do both with the legal construction of the global chain 
and the internal power dynamics between its actors and with the legal 
construction of the migrant worker as an invisible, exploitable, available, and 
disposable means of production. More importantly, they are interconnected: 
the existence of power asymmetries along the chain and the attempt to reduce 
costs to increase margins go hand in hand with the search for cheaper labor. 
At the same time, the existence of cheap labor creates the conditions for the 
Italian passata to be competitive and, therefore, to be integrated in global 
chains that reach consumers in the four corners of the planet. However, this 
interdependence is missing from the mainstream political and legal debate in 
Italy, where the process of criminalization of caporalato is schizophrenically 
surrounded not only by legislative attempts to increase the price received by 
farmers but also by an intensification of the anti-migrant attitude and a 
reduction of the opportunities for migrants to obtain permits and regularly 
remain in the country.  
Three kinds of legal initiatives are worth noting which represent an 
attempt to redress the unequal distribution of power between farmers and 
buyers, although they are still in their inception and aim at challenging 
“unfair trade practices,” rather than embedding buyer-seller negotiations into 
the broader legal, economic, and cultural context. The first one falls in an 
area across contract law and competition law and is enshrined in Article 62 
of Law Decree 1/2012 and in the recent EU Directive on Unfair Trade 
Practices, EU 2019/633.49 Both the national law and the EU Directive apply 
to business-to-business (B2B) sales and purchases in the agri-food chain and 
aim at increasing the transparency of negotiations; consolidating the certainty 
of contracts; introducing minimum requirements in terms of the content of 
contracts, changes, and cancellations; and banning certain unfair trading 
practices imposed unilaterally by one trading partner (normally the buyer) on 
 
48 Nature is cheap when it can be contaminated with fertilizers and pesticides, when soil can be 
depleted, and when natural resources are not regenerated but exclusively extracted. Productivity and 
global competition in the passata sector also lead to these behaviors, thus the role of cheap nature should 
never be forgotten. See PATEL & MOORE, supra note 12; Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 
74 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2011). 
49 Council Directive 2019/633, 2019 O.J. (L 111) (discussing unfair trading practices in business-
to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain). 
5 - FERRANDO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/2021  12:13 PM 
538 FIU Law Review [Vol. 14:521 
 
another. A step forward in the recognition of the power imbalance that 
characterizes the agri-food chain and can have an indirect impact on the 
agricultural workers, both the law and the Directive refrain from dealing with 
the process of price formation and the race to the bottom that is generated by 
structural and economic circumstances, such as poor logistics, market 
concentration, and lack of alternative markets for products.50 
On the contrary, the way in which the agricultural price is determined is 
at the core of a bill on double-race tenders that was approved by the House 
of Representatives in 2019 and awaits discussion by the Senate.51 The bill on 
double-race tenders was strongly invoked by civil society organizations and 
media and aims at banning the use by retailers of a mechanism consisting of 
two rounds of tenders among processing companies, one before the harvest 
and one after the harvest, through which processing companies pre-sell the 
passata to the retailer and then negotiate with farmers on the basis of the price 
that they have offered. As reported by #FilieraSporca, such a mechanism: 
strongly affects the entire value chain, both because of the 
speed with which it takes place and because companies are 
forced to agree to sales well before production quantities and 
costs have been determined. Having pre-sold at very low 
prices, processing companies therefore have to negotiate the 
lowest possible prices with producers, who must in turn 
make savings by hiring the cheapest possible labor or 
breaking their contractual obligations to farm workers.52 
Yet, low prices continue to be offered to farmers even if double-race 
tenders have been discontinued, revealing that it is not only a matter of 
negotiation but a structural issue.   
The third relevant intervention in this area is the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) as a form of public support of agriculture and, therefore, a 
direct subsidy to the cost of production that may reduce farmers’ dependency 
on the market and, therefore, increase social and environmental practices. 
Leaving aside the specificities of the CAP and the distortive nature of public 
subsidies, the EU policy has helped farmers remain in the business but has 
not yet triggered virtuous dynamics with regards to working conditions. On 
the contrary, the possibility to access the financial support of the CAP has 
represented an appealing profit opportunity for Italian criminal organizations, 
 
50 There are 9,456 farms producing processing tomatoes in Italy. However, 95 percent of the 
transformation is realized by 91 processing facilities, 21 of which are in the North of the country. See 
Perrotta, supra note 5. 
51 Atto Senaato n. 1373, Limitazioni alla vendita sottocosto di prodotti agricoli e divieto di aste a 
doppio ribasso (It.). 
52 #FILIERASPORCA, LA RACCOLTA DEI RIFUGIATI (2016). 
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while the CAP itself has intensified the socio-economic inequality between 
small-scale and large-scale farmers (putting more pressure on the former and 
pushing them towards socio-environmental unsustainable or illegal 
practices)53 and has shifted the burden of supporting agriculture from the 
market to the public authority. Aware that agriculture is receiving financial 
support through the CAP and is considered a central economic activity in the 
region, buyers know that they can lower the price per kilo, in a way 
privatizing the public resources aimed at the agricultural sector. 
From the point of view of agricultural productivity, the limited 
effectiveness of the measures aimed at increasing revenues and bargaining 
power of farmers is somehow “counterbalanced” by the normalization of a 
state of emergency,54 the increased criminalization of “irregular” or 
undocumented migrants, and the intensification of the xenophobic attitude of 
both policy makers and the broad public. Only in the last two years, the 
Ministerial Decree of 20 November 2018 on the role and function of the 
centers of initial reception and the “Security Decree” carrying the name of 
the then Minister of Internal Affairs Matteo Salvini55 have weakened, as 
clearly stated in a 2019 report by Amnesty International, “the condition of 
the asylum seeker and of those migrants who receive protection, . . . 
producing social marginalization and ghettoization that are more likely to be 
exploited by criminal interests and mafia organizations (exploiters, 
traffickers, caporali and Mafiosi).”56 
This article is not the appropriate space to discuss the details of all the 
measures introduced in the last two years, which span from the cut of 
financial support to the centers of first reception and the denial of registration 
for asylum seekers, nor to provide a detailed analysis of the way in which 
they materially and legally impact the life and opportunities of non-EU 
citizens. Yet, to understand the connection between the emergency decrees, 
the creation of a labor reserve army and the thriving of illicit intermediation 
it is enough to consider that almost 87,000 people lost their right to live in 
Italy as a consequence of the new decrees and that on January 1, 2020, they 
also lost the right to be hosted in a reception center.  
 
53 In 2013, the top 0.8 percent of the beneficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy received 
26.3 percent of the full amount of resources disbursed in favor of the whole Italian agricultural sector. 
More interestingly, 0.001 percent of the farms (150 in total) received around 6 percent of all the direct 
payments aimed from Brussels to the sector. The remaining 94 percent of farms shared just 39.5 percent 
of all CAP subsidies. Commission Factsheet on CAP Expenditure in 2013 by Member States (2015). 
54 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: IL POTERE SOVRANO E LA NUDA VITA (1995). 
55 Decreto legge 4 ottobre 2018, n.113, G.U. Oct. 4, 2018, n.231 (It.).  
56 AMNESTY INT’L, I SOMMERSI DELL’ACCOGLIENZA CONSEGUENZE DEL DECRETO LEGGE 
113/2018 SUL SISTEMA DI ACCOGLIENZA ITALIANO (2019). 
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For sure, the Italian legal framework contains ad hoc forms of protection 
in the case of extra-EU citizens who are victims of violence or exploitation, 
such as the permit for social protection57 and the permit for those who are 
victims of labor exploitation.58 However, they have a limited length (six 
months that can be renewed if the conditions remain), and their interpretation 
by the public prosecutors is increasingly subordinating their release to the 
provision of relevant information on the exploiters and to the proof of an 
actual and serious danger for the migrant. More precisely, non-EU migrants 
who are victims of exploitation and abuses would only be protected if they 
actively contributed to the investigation against the perpetrator and if they 
could provide evidence that they are facing a serious and immediate danger. 
Thus, the discipline seems to overlook the cultural, personal, and economic 
obstacles towards denouncing and cooperating and, more importantly, 
normalizes forms of exploitation that are not dangerous or immediate. 
Considering the broader context and the increasing criminalization of 
migration, it should not come as a surprise that these permits have not been 
particularly effective and that they are not seen as valuable options by non-
EU farmworkers who populate the Italian countryside.59  
The moment we move away from the tomato and we embed it into the 
wider legal and economic context of global passata chains and global human 
mobility, it becomes evident how inappropriate it would be to look at 
caporalato in isolation from the rest of the legal, economic, and social 
context in which migrants, caporali, and farmers are embedded. Yet, despite 
the interconnectedness between people, places, and issues, national and 
regional legal solutions reproduce a waterproof attitude that cannot grasp the 
plurality of legal structures that define rights, produce value, and allocate 
power. Although the new anti-caporalato law of 2016 represents a step 
forward compared to the previous version (mainly because it moves beyond 
the worker–caporale dynamic to include employers as the beneficiaries of 
the exploitative practices), it appears inadequate and potentially a source of 
serious unexpected consequences both for workers and farmers. A radical 
intervention is thus needed, which redefines power relationships through the 
lenses of migratory status, distribution of value across the chain, and the race 
to the bottom generated by the global competition that characterizes the 
market for processing tomatoes, passata, and other tomato-based products. 
Yet, is such radical intervention desired? 
 
57 D.Lgs. n. 286/98, art. 18 (It.). 
58 D.Lgs. n. 286/98, art. 22 ¶ 12 (It.). 
59 In the five years after the introduction of Article 603 bis in 2011, only 500 workers denounced 
the caporali, a number that is equivalent to 0.1 percent of the victims of caporalato. 
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V. TRANSNATIONAL COLLABORATION TO ESCAPE THE POLITICAL 
AND LEGISLATIVE “CATCH-22” 
This article has offered a critical legal and chain-based analysis of the 
forms of labor exploitation that lie behind the Italian passata (tomato sauce) 
as a product that is known all over the world and that makes Italy a world 
leader after the United States and before China. In line with mainstream legal 
accounts, the story began with a depiction of the severe abuses suffered by 
hundreds of thousands of workers in the Italian agricultural sector (mainly 
non-EU citizens) and connected them with the thriving phenomenon of 
caporalato, (i.e., the illicit intermediation between workers and employers) 
which is often conducted by members of Mafia.  
Moreover, this article is also an attempt to depart from the dominant 
reading of caporalato as a problem of the Mafia and has suggested that it is 
incorrect and ineffective to focus on the workers–intermediary–employer 
relationships without embedding them in the broader context of the whole 
passata chain and in the even wider context of the legal construction of illegal 
and irregular migrants. It is only then, I believe, that it is possible to expose 
the root causes of one of the most significant problems faced by the Italian 
agricultural sector and to question the role of law (contract law, EU law, 
criminal law and—more importantly—migration law) in producing cheap 
lives and cheap labor. No criminal intervention and no anti-caporalato law 
will be effective until workers are emancipated from their current condition 
of invisibility and vulnerability and their value along the chain is fairly and 
justly distributed in order to adequately remunerate labor and nature. 
Yet, are we sure that emancipation and just prices is what Italy (as a 
government, a legislative body, and as one of the largest economies in the 
world) really wants? The annual value of Italian tomatoes’ derivatives 
(including the “gangmastered” passata) is estimated at 3.3 billion euros, half 
of which is exported. Moreover, workers’ exploitation does not only concern 
the red vegetables, but the whole Italian agricultural sector, whose economic 
value exceeds 55 billion euros every year and which represented 41 billion 
euros in export in 2017.60 A reform aimed at agricultural workers, which 
recognizes their legal status and their full rights, enforces the payment of 
minimum salaries and appropriate working hours, and guarantees the 
provision of healthy living conditions and social security, etc., would 
certainly redefine the power dynamics at the bottom of the chain and move 
the labor reserve army away from the control of criminal organizations. 
However, such intervention would likely cause an increase in the costs of 
 
60 ISMEA, supra note 7, at 13. 
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production, possible higher prices for the passata, and a reduction in the 
competitiveness of Italian processing tomatoes vis-à-vis varieties farmed 
elsewhere under different labor and production conditions. In addition, an 
increase in the cost of labor without any form of public support to the farmers 
(such as procurement of the tomatoes at a price that guarantees a living wage 
to the workers) may create an incentive towards mechanization and nudge 
farmers to replace workers with machines, thus erasing the potential positive 
impact of regularization of workers’ lives, generating more unemployment 
and urbanization, and also intensifying the process of land concentration in 
favor of wealthier producers and the abandonment of the countryside by 
smallholders. 
Once again, these considerations are valid only if we do not pay enough 
attention to the way in which labor relations and individuals are embedded in 
longer chains populated by multiple actors who appropriate and accumulate 
value. If we only look at the cost of production that may correspond to higher 
legal standards, it is true that legislators and small-scale farmers may appear 
trapped in a “catch-22” where cheap lives and cheap labor contribute to the 
global competitiveness of the Italian passata, to affordable products that can 
be bought in supermarkets all over the world, and to the permanence of 
farmers on the land. However, if we adopt a food system approach to 
gangmastering and illicit intermediation, we realize that the higher cost of 
production associated with regularization and the full respect of people’s and 
workers’ rights is a problem only if we take for granted that the value of a 
passata must be distributed in the same way that it is distributed today and if 
we assume that there is no alternative to global competition. 
Regarding the first point, it is enough to consider that out of an average 
price of 1.3 euros per bottle of passata, almost 53 percent is appropriated by 
the retailer, while the current remuneration of farmers is around 8 percent, 
and the processor receives 18 percent. If we start from the assumption that 
the current distribution of value along the chain cannot be changed, we can 
only conclude that a more expensive Italian passata would lead to higher 
prices, thus putting the burden on the consumers and reducing the 
consumption. However, if we read the same figures through the lenses of 
annual profits and dividend distribution of global retailers, which in some 
cases reach the billions, we realize the importance of questioning the current 
distribution of value and the priority that is often attributed to rewarding 
private investors over labor and consumers.  
For what concerns the possibility for more expensive Italian tomatoes 
to be replaced with tomatoes harvested elsewhere, it would be too naïve to 
say that Italian tomatoes are unique and that the Italian flag guarantees a 
comparative advantage. As a matter of fact, production of processing 
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tomatoes in the US, China, and Spain is increasing,61 and international trade 
law rules that allow countries to limit the import of products obtained in 
violation of human rights have very limited leverage at the moment.62 Thus, 
the legal and political fight against caporalato and exploitation undertaken 
in the Italian countryside will have to be supported by public measures, such 
as public procurement and incentives to rural development, along with an 
intensification of the collaboration between workers and farmers operating in 
different countries that replaces the mechanisms of pure economic 
competitiveness with a more sophisticated notion of sustainable 
competitiveness based on principles of social and environmental justice.  
The transition from competition to collaboration is intellectually, 
economically, and legally complex and not easy to envisage. However, a 
move away from price-based competition and the narrative of “winners and 
losers of the market” appears essential if we want to find a third way to the 
alternative between maintaining exploitation and fostering depeasantization. 
In a competitive context, cheapness represents an advantage and an 
opportunity to drive other businesses out of the market. Collaboration, on the 
contrary, shall guarantee that socio-environmental improvements obtained at 
one point of one chain (e.g., farmworkers in Italy in the passata chain) are 
not going to come back as a boomerang in the form of unemployment, 
delocalization, or mechanization.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the example of the Italian passata discussed in this paper 
has proved the need for a chain-based and legal-pluralist approach when 
analyzing and engaging with forms of exploitation like gangmastering, which 
are embedded in longer value chains and involve multiple actors operating at 
different levels and—in some cases—jurisdictions. In addition, the search for 
effective solutions in the context of a global market for tomatoes’ derivatives 
has highlighted the role of economic considerations in potentially 
constraining the actions of the legislator and the inherent limits of price-based 
competitiveness as an incentive to produce and exploit cheap labor and cheap 
lives. Thus, a call has been made for holistic and collaborative interventions 
that address the root causes underlying workers’ exploitation in the Italian 
agricultural sector, focus on the current distribution of value across the chain, 
and identify viable solutions to the potential regressive implications of 
 
61 See Perrotta, supra note 25. 
62 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs art. XX, Apr. 14, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187.  
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fighting gangmastering without a right-based vision of the future of food and 
the legal emancipation of agricultural workers. 
